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Furthermore, by recognizing the probative value of personal opinion testimony under limited circumstances, the court should go on to
realize that the same value is present when the personal opinion testimony comes in by itself and that safeguards are available to prevent any
adverse effects of such an offer of proof.52 Having acknowledged the
value of the evidence, there is no justification for the court's not differentiating between evidence of reputation and of personal knowledge and
belief as suggested by Professor Wigmore. 53 In short, there would seem
to be no reason why the court, if it is disposed to move away from the
majority rule, should not completely embrace the minority position. As
stated by Professor Ladd, "[t]he emphasis upon the means of proving
character should be directed to the probative quality of the -testimony to
be obtained rather than4 to the formalistic procedure of satisfying the de'
mands of legal ritual."
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Stegmann
raises almost as many questions as it answers and will obviously need
clarification in later cases. However, it seems to represent the first
tentative steps on the part of the court to adopt a new approach to the
controversial area of character evidence. At least for the time being, it
is clear that character testimony may consist of both the general reputation of the individual in question and personal observations and opinions of the witness concerning the person in question. This is a new
rule, and practicing attorneys in North Carolina should take careful note
of it.
STEVEN WILLIAM SUFLAS

Federal Courts-Bradford v. Weinstein: The Federal Courts
Reopen the Door to Prisoners' Civil Rights Claims
Since the mid-1960's the federal courts have witnessed a tremendous influx of state prisoner petitions. 1 Claimants have sought civil
52. Proper requirements for laying a foundation for a witness's testimony and for
cross-examination will serve to exclude testimony with an inadequate basis or founded
on personal prejudice. Likewise, control of the proceedings by the presiding judge will
avert a degeneration of the testimony into a listing of specific acts of the person in
question or a recounting of his life's history, which are both still condemned.
53. VII I. WIGMOM, EVIDENCE § 1986 (3d ed. 1940).
54. Ladd, supra note 24, at 517-18.
1. Petitions filed by state prisoners in the federal courts totaled 13,423 in 1974, an
increase of 1,439.3% over the total in 1960. The 1974 total is more than double the
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relief under 42 U.S.C. section 19832 and release from incarceration
through writs of habeas corpus. 3 The impetus for this influx of claims
arose from the lack of effective grievance procedures within the prison
system,4 as well as from the concern expressed by some federal judges
over the acute conditions in many state prisons.5 As a result of the increasing number of state prisoner petitions and the judicial activism of
some judges, federal courts began to engage actively in prison reform."
In Preiser v. Rodriguez,7 however, the United States Supreme Court
greatly inhibited the consideration of the merits of prisoners' claims by
the federal courts. 8 Apparently motivated by concern over jammed
dockets' and fears of federal judicial activism destroying federal-state
6,248 petitions filed in 1966. Habeas corpus petitions increased from 5,339 in 1966 to
7,626 in 1974, a 42.8% increase. Civil rights petitions increased from 218 in 1966 to
5,236 in 1974, a 2,301.8% increase. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMiNiSTRATrvE OFmcn op mHu
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 220-21 (1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Habeas corpus was originally a writ at common law. It is now codified in 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
4. See Singer & Keating, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms, 19 CruMn m
DELNQUENcY 367 (1973). Singer and Keating conclude that the lack of effective
grievance procedures is one of the major reasons for prison violence.
5. An example of the judicial concern over the outrageous conditions in many
state prisons can be seen in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). In
Jordan, Chief Judge George Harris, registering a sense of outrage over the conditions he
saw at California's Soledad prison complex, took steps "to restore the primal rules of a
civilized community in accord with the mandate of the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 680.
6. The impetus for federal judicial action in the area of prison reform can be
traced to the decision in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See,
e.g., Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574
(8th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Hahn v.
Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1969); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
8. The Washington Post described Preiser as a "setback for civil rights and civil
liberties groups and the American Bar Association. . . . The Court effectively closed
off access to federal courts which have shown the most sympathy for prisoner's
grievances." Washington Post, May 8, 1973, § 5A, at 3, col. 3.
9. Although the Court in Preiser never referred to the large number of prisoner
petitions, it is safe to assume that it was aware of the situation since briefs filed in the
case dealt at length with this issue. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Brief for Respondent at
27, Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae at 28, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
The Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court has suggested an imposition of
unique exhaustion requirements on prisoners' section 1983 actions. See Doyle, The
Court'sResponsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JunxcruRE 406, 409 n.8 (1973).
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relations, 10 the Court placed serious restraints on the prisoner's use of
section 1983.11 The Court found that many categories of prisoners'
section 1983 claims fall within the "core of habeas corpus" and thus
require exhaustion of available state remedies before the federal courts
can consider the claims. 2 A year after the Preiser decision, in Bradford
v. Weinstein' 3 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals extended jurisdiction
to a prisoner's section 1983 challenge to a parole proceeding, 1 4 a
situation in which the Preiser test arguably required habeas corpus
proceedings. 5 Bradford's rejection of the Preiser test in this situation
illustrates the lower courts' desire to limit the applicability of Preiser and
to establish the federal courts as a forum for prison reform.
The Bradford appeal was a consolidation of two class action suits,
one brought in the name of Howard Bradford, an inmate in the North
Carolina prison system, and the other by Levi Jenkins, a prisoner in
South Carolina. Both prisoners brought section 1983 actions alleging
that the hearings in which they were denied parole did not comport with
due process of law."8 The federal district court in North Carolina
denied Bradford's claim, holding that the due process clause does not
apply to parole proceedings. The federal district court in South Carolina dismissed Jenkins' petition on the ground that plaintiffs goal was
parole and that therefore the claim was "within the core" of habeas
corpus. The court concluded that under Preiser Jenkins would be
required first to exhaust his state remedies.' 7 On appeal the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower courts' decisions. 18 First, considering the due
process claim, the court found that the due process clause does apply to
parole eligibility proceedings. 9 However, the court postponed a decision on what procedure the due process clause requires in this situation
20
until after the district court conducted a full evidentiary investigation.
The court then considered whether the prisoners' claims were proper
under section 1983. After a short examination of Preiser, the court
10. 411 U.S. at 490-92.
11. Id. at 489-90.
12. Id. at 487-94.
13. 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court heard the case and
delivered a per curiam opinion that declared the case moot since Bradford had been
released on parole prior to the date of hearing. 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975).
14. 519 F.2d at 734-35.
15. See id. at 735-38 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 729-30.
17. Id. at 730.
18. Id. at 735.
19. Id. at 732.
20. ld. at 733.
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concluded that the relief requested was not for immediate release from
confinement and thus was not "within the core of habeas corpus" as
defined by Preiser.2 1 The court therefore held that it had jurisdiction to
consider the prisoners' section 1983 claim.22 Judge Bryan filed a
vigorous dissent to the majority's granting of jurisdiction. Stating that
Preiser must be applied broadly in order to protect the state interest in
the area, Bryan viewed the plaintiffs' challenges to the parole hearings as
attacks on their detention and thus proper subjects for habeas corpus.2 s
Before analyzing the conflicting applications of the Preiser test by
the majority and dissent in Bradford, it will be helpful to examine the
development of the writ of habeas corpus and section 1983. An
understanding of the overlapping features of these two procedures will
facilitate an understanding of the problems in applying the Preiser test
to a situation such as the one in Bradford.
The principal means for prisoners to attack the legitimacy of their
confinement has traditionally been to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 24
Originally the writ offered a prisoner a method to challenge the legitimacy of his confinement by attacking the validity of his sentence or
conviction. 25 Release from confinement was the available relief. 20
However, the federal courts expanded the writ to remedy unconstitutional conditions of confinement and to alleviate gross mistreatment of
prisoners.2 7 It was no longer necessary for the inmate to seek total
release from prison in order to obtain the writ. 28 However, there is one
significant limitation on the use of habeas corpus. In the 1886 case Ex
parte Royal129 the Supreme Court strongly urged the federal courts, in
cases of a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief, to await the
exhaustion of available state judicial remedies before granting jurisdiction over the prisoner's federal habeas corpus claim. The requirement
21. Id. at 733-34.
22. Id. at 734-35.
23. Id. at 736.
24. See note 3 supra.
25. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 484. See generally Developments in the
Law-FederalHabeasCorpus, 83 HAiv. L. R y. 1038 (1970).
26. See generally Developments in the Law, 83 HA~v. L. REv., supra note 25, at
1079.
27. The federal courts expanded the writ in Coffin v. Riechard, 143 F.2d 443, 445
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) where habeas corpus was recognized
as a remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The Supreme Court
affirmed this expansive role in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
28. In Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Supreme Court approved the
use of habeas corpus to challenge a prisoner's solitary confinement. It was not necessary
for the inmate to seek total release from prison.
29. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
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of exhausting state remedies, born of a policy of preserving comity
between the federal and state judiciaries, is now codifiedY"
Although the reach of habeas corpus has been extended to allow

consideration of the conditions of confinement,"1 section 1983 has been
seen as a more appropriate vehicle to raise such challenges.

The Civil

Rights Act, of which section 1983 is a part, was designed to combat the
injustices and discrimination that existed throughout the South during
Reconstruction. 32 In Monroe v. Pape33 the Supreme Court rejuvenated

the statute by holding that section 1983 provides a federal remedy for
violations of an individual's constitutional rights by officials acting
under "color of state law."34 The Act has since been applied to many
areas of state involvement,35 including prison problems."'
Although the coverage of the two acts clearly overlaps, there are

several reasons for prisoners' preference of section 1983. 3 7 The most
obvious reason is that section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state
remedies."' Exhaustion is time-consuming and expensive,39 and to
prisoners, who have very little concern for federal-state comity, it simply
appears to be another obstacle constructed by the judicial system to
prevent consideration of their grievances. Additionally, section 1983
offers a wide range of relief, including damages and broad equity
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-(c) (1970).
31. See note 27 supra.
32. See Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape,and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. Rv. 277 (1965). This article contains a good discussion of the history of
section 1983 and the Civil Rights Act. The article also includes excerpts from speeches
by Congressmen showing their concern over violence in the South after the Civil War
and demanding passage of the Act
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34. Id. at 184-85, 187.
35. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public education); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (police procedure); Holmes v. New York Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing).
36. The Supreme Court specifically approved the use of section 1983 for relief
from certain prison conditions. The cases approved in Preiser were Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per
curiam); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam); and Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
37. See generally Turner, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice in Prisoner Cases, in
PRISONERs' RiGHTs SOURCEnOOK 243 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds. 1973).
38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). In finding that one did not have
to resort to a state remedy even if it would give the relief if enforced, Justice Douglas
stated: "[tihe federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." id.
39. To complete the gamut of state remedies before federal relief is available may
require months or even years. In cases where the challenge is to the parole procedure
the case might actually become moot by the time the case is heard by the federal courts.
See note 13 supra.
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powers.40 Class actions can also be maintained under section 1983. 41
Finally, section 1983 enables the petitioner to utilize the liberal discovery procedures under the federal rules of procedure,4 2 as compared to
discovery pursuant to a federal habeas corpus claim, which is allowed
only upon obtaining a court order.4"
Although these two statutory remedies were at one time equally
available to state prisoners, the Supreme Court's attempt in Preiser v.
Rodriguez to define the relationship between the two resulted in serious
limitations on the use of section 1983. 44 The case involved a civil rights
action by three prisoners. Their complaint alleged that they had been
deprived of previously earned good time credits without being afforded
due process.45 The earned credits counted towards the reduction of
their sentences. The Supreme Court noted that the "essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person upon the legality of that custody, and
that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody." 46 Since the remedy of restoration of the lost credits would
shorten the prisoners' time of confinement, the Supreme Court read the
prisoners' challenges as being to the "fact or duration" of their illegal
confinement and "as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on
the prisoner's conviction.

. .

.,4

The Court held, therefore, that the

prisoners' complaints should be treated as applications for writs of
habeas corpus and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 48
The majority announced the test that if the prisoner is challenging the
fact or duration of his confinement and seeking release or shortening of
his term of confinement, then habeas corpus is the sole remedy. 49 The
Court reasoned that this test would protect the policy behind the exhaus40. See note 2 supra.
41. The requisites of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be met.
F . R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2). See Zagaris, Recent Developments in Prison Litigation:
ProceduralIssues and Remedies, 14 SANTA. CLARA LAw. 810, 831 (1974). Zagaris points
out that class actions are particularly well suited for prison plaintiffs. Zagaris notes
several reasons including that: (1) with a class of plaintiffs, the complete action cannot
be declared moot by the release of one prisoner, (2) the large number of plaintiffs allows
more extensive discovery, and (3) that attorneys' fees are often awarded in the class
action context. Id. at 831-34.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.

43% See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
44. 411 U.S. at 489-90.
45. Id. at 476-77.
46. Id. at 484.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 481. In essence the Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling in the
companion case of United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir.
1971).
49. 411 U.S. at 500.
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tion requirement and allow the states to have the first opportunity to

correct state errors.50

Despite the apparent simplicity of the test announced in Preiser,

the decision left the lower courts confused as to how to apply the test.
Preiser clearly barred certain section 1983 suits: challenges to procedures involving loss of good time credit, since relief in such a suit would

result in the prisoner's early release; 5 and challenges to parole revocations, since a successful claim would reinstate parole.52

Equally as

clear, Preiser would not require exhaustion in certain situations: a
challenge to the conditions of confinement, such as a claim of inadequate physical facilities; and a challenge for which no adequate state
remedy existed.5 3 However, there remained many intermediate situations which did not clearly fall either within or outside the Court's

concept of the "core of habeas corpus. 54
Bradford confronted the court of appeals with just such a difficult
situation for application of the Preiser test. Since the prisoners were
challenging the constitutionality of the procedure employed at the parole
board hearings, 55 their allegations did not easily fall into the category of

"conditions of confinement";58 nor could their petitions be viewed as
requesting "release."

Rather, their claims were directed at the proce-

dure of the parole board, which is an intricate part of the release system.
If the court interpreted Preiser to apply only in the narrow circum-

stances in which the prisoner's challenge is directed towards the fact or
50. Id. at 491-92. Justice Brennan authored a dissenting opinion that criticized the
majority's decision as "analytically unsound." The dissenters argued that the protection
of federal rights should not succumb to protection of federal-state relations and that
section 1983 should take precedence over habeas corpus and its exhaustion requirement.
Justice Brennan pointed out the difficulty in applying the majority's test as well as its
failure to prevent federal-state friction. Id. at 475, 500-25 (dissenting opinion).
51. Id. at 475.
52. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), a case prior to Preiser, the
Supreme Court found that exhaustion was required in an administratively imposed parole
revocation. See also Mason v. Askew, 484 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In
Mason the prisoner contended that parole revocation was inflicted with substantive and
procedural infirmities and sought relief under section 1983. The court denied the -claim
on the grounds of Preiser.
53. See, e.g., Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. Examples of situations not clearly within or outside the Court's concept of
"core of habeas corpus" are challenges to parole hearings, challenges to procedures
assigning an inmate to a special facility (such as a hospital for drug abusers) and
challenges to transfers of an inmate from one prison facility to another.
55. 519 F.2d at 734-35.
56. The most clear cut situations falling within "conditions of confinement" are
challenges to physical conditions or illegal actions of guards or other prison .personnel.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
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duration of his confinement and actual release is requested, then it
would have to conclude that the prisoners should be allowed to pursue
their section 1983 claims. However, if the court broadened the scope of
Preiserto include within the core of habeas corpus any challenge to the
release system, regardless of how remote the chance of actual release,
then their claims would necessarily fall because state remedies were not
first exhausted.
One member of the court, Senior Judge Bryan, chose the latter
alternative and read Preiser to require habeas corpus relief when a
prisoner is attacking the parole hearing process. 57 Reasoning that the
parole hearing is an event in the chain of ultimate detention and that a
change in the hearing procedure may eventually affect the duration of
incarceration, Bryan believed that the prisoners' complaints related to
their detention, not to the circumstances of imprisonment. 8 Therefore,
he concluded that plaintiffs' claims fell within the core of habeas corpus,
thus initially requiring exhaustion of state remedies. 5 Bryan's view
raises the question whether the possibility of release, no matter how
remote, should be regarded as within the core. In Preiserthe prisoners
were not actually seeking release but were challenging procedures that
denied them good time credits.60 However, if their claims had been
successful they would have been entitled to immediate release, with no
further proceedings necessary. Even so, release was actually collateral
to the claim. Bryan seemed to have seized on the collateral nature of
release in Preiser and extended it to support the proposition that any
potential release is within the core. Bryan justified such an extension
on the 'basis of protection of state-federal comity.6
Judges Winter and Butzner took the opposite approach in narrowly
applying the Preiser test. They believed that Preiser does not apply
unless the purpose of the suit is to seek release or to shorten the duration
of confinement.6" In Bradford, however, the prisoners did not request
release; a favorable ruling would only entitle them to another parole
hearing. 63 By narrowly construing the language of Preiser,the majority
seemed to reason that the remote chance that the prisoners' claims
would actually expedite their release was not sufficient to bring their
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

519 F.2d at 736.
Id.
Id. at 736-37.
411 U.S. at 476-77.
519 F.2d at 736-37.
See id. at 733.
Id. at 730-32.
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Other lower federal courts

have shared the majority's view that the "possibility of release" should

not control in determining whether the claim is within the core of habeas
corpus."
The majority's restricted application of Preiser receives a great

deal of support from Gomez v. Miller, 5 a three-judge district court
opinion that was given summary affirmance by the Supreme Court.,6

As there was a detailed dissent by Judge Moore on the habeas corpus
issue, 7 the Supreme Court must have considered the jurisdictional question and found the district court's opinion acceptable. 6 8 In
Gomez three persons challenged their incarceration in hospitals for the

criminally insane.69 The plaintiffs, who were indicted for various felonies but were untried, brought a section 1983 action contending that the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment

required the state to prove in a jury trial that they were "dangerous"
before they could be committed to a prison hospital.10 The case is
similar to Bradford, for in neither instance was there a challenge to the
state's right to place the plaintiffs in their particular situation, namely
placing them in a hospital or denying them parole, as long as it was
done constitutionally. The district court in Gomez rejected the state's
contention that habeas corpus relief was required. 7

The court noted

that at best the relief sought would result in a transfer to a civilian
64. In Wingard v. North Carolina, 366 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.C. 1973), a district
court allowed a section 1983 claim, stating that the relief prayed for, if granted, would
make the prisoner eligible for parole but would not constitute an actual grant of parole
and thus not actual release. As in Bradford, the court read Preiser to require the
prisoner to pursue habeas corpus when the only relief sought is an immediate or more
speedy release from prison.
In Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), state prisoners brought
section 1983 actions challenging the constitutionality of prison disciplinary procedures.
They did not seek immediate or earlier release from prison. Even though the challenged
disciplinary procedures had some effect on determining length of imprisonment, the
Ninth Circuit found that the effect of those procedures on the duration of the plaintiff's
sentence was too speculative and incidental to bring any part of the action within the
core of habeas corpus.
65. 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd mem., 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 333 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore felt that the petition should be
read as a writ of habeas corpus and thus the prisoner should be required to exhaust state
remedies. Judge Moore based his conclusion on the policy of protecting federal-state
comity.
68. At least one federal court has agreed that the Supreme Court could not have
overlooked the jurisdictional question in giving Gomez summary affirmance. Blouin v.
Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (1973).
69. 341 F. Supp. at 324.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 328.
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hospital and not outright release. 72 Such reasoning seems equally applicable to Bradford, in which the relief would at best result in another
hearing, not in outright release. In both Gomez and Bradford the relief
being sought would bring the plaintiffs closer to release. But the
Supreme Court in affirming Gomez impliedly approved the reasoning
which found that simply improving the chances of release was not
sufficient to require the use of habeas corpus.
The question still remains why the federal courts have been unwilling to extend Preiserto the limits suggested by Judge Bryan. There are
several answers, two of which can be found in the Bradford court's use
of Wolff v. McDonnell.7" In Wolff the Supreme Court allowed a
section 1983 challenge to the procedures used in revoking good time
credits. 74 Judge Bryan took issue with the majority's citing of Wolff to
support their interpretation of the Preiser test. Bryan distinguished
Wolff on the ground that it involved a claim for damages, which made it
automatically a proper subject for section 1983 relief. 75 Although
correct in his conclusion, Bryan's reasoning points out a flaw in the
Preisertest. Preiserrecognized that since damages are not recoverable
in habeas corpus, "a damages action by a state prisoner could be
brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies." 78 The result is that, when
possible, prisoner petitions will request damage relief. In a situation in
which there is a claim for damages coupled with a complaint that might
otherwise be relegated to the habeas corpus procedure, the federal courts
could either retain the entire case on theories of pendent jurisdiction or
retain the damage claim only and send the remainder of the suit to the
state courts. 77 The second alternative can result in waste of judicial
energy as well as increased friction between the federal and state courts
due to the possiblity of inconsistent results.78 To avoid having to make
72. Id.
73. 418 U.S. 539 (1974), discussed in 519 F.2d at 737-38.

74. 418 U.S. at 554-55.
75. 519 F.2d at 737.
76. 411 U.S. at 494.
77. See Zagaris, supra note 41, at 831. However, one court has found that it would
not consider a damage action if a ruling would imply that a state conviction is or would
be illegal. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974). In Edwards v. Illinois
Dep't of Corrections, 514 F.2d 477, 478 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975), the court noted that it
did not have to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for money damages for failure to exhaust
state remedies. Also, in Henderson v. Secretary of Correction, 518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir.
1975), the court recognized that as long as the plaintiff asserted damages his claim could
be heard.
78. Zagaris, supra note 41, at 831.
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this choice, many federal courts have attempted to limit Preiserin order
to have jurisdiction over most prisoners' section 1983 claims.
The majority in Bradford also had to deal with the broad language
employed by Preiser in announcing a policy of protecting the state's
interest in having the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the
internal administration of its prisons. The language was arguably
broad enough to include challenges to the parole system, as well as all
other attacks on prison administration.7" The question to be resolved
was whether the policy of protecting the state's interest in the prison
system demanded a consistently broad application of the Preiser test.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Preiser was clearly not intended to
preclude all section 1983 challenges by prisoners. It supported this
position by noting that the Court in Preiser had carefully reaffirmed its
holding in four earlier cases in which prisoners had brought section
1983 claims challenging some aspect of the penal system.80 Also, the
Bradford court demonstrated that the Supreme Court had further limited the broad policy language by its later holding in Wolff. In Wolff the
Supreme Court disallowed restoration of good time credits but did allow
a determination of the validity of the procedures for revoking the
credits.8 ' Impliedly, the Court found that the state interest does not
preclude such a challenge to prison administration systems as long as
release is not sought.8 2 Thus, the policy of protecting the state's interest
should not preclude the claim in Bradford, since the claimant, as in
Wolff, sought procedural protection without asking for release.
By limiting the application of the policy of protecting state interest
to the situation in which the prisoner seeks release, courts are acting
79. The Bradford court was quick to acknowledge the broad scope of the relevant
language. 519 F.2d at 734. The relevant discussion in Preiser can be found at 411 U.S.
491-92.
80. Preiser approved four state prisoner cases which did not require federal habeas
corpus remedy: Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (claim arising out
of an allegedly unconstitutional solitary confinement); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249 (1971) (per curiam) (challenge to living conditions and disciplinary measures
imposed while in maximum security of prison); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968) (per curiam) (legal materials confiscated by prison officials); Cooper v. Pate,
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (prisoner denied permission to purchase specific
religious publications). It seems clear that in each case the Supreme Court is approving
of the federal judiciary's interference with the state prison system.
81. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
82. See id. at 554-55.
Wolff can be distinguished from Bradford on the ground that the claimant is
seeking damages, but as mentioned previously, this argument seems to be placing form
over substance. There is no logic in an argument that state interests should be protected
when no damages are sought while disregarding those interests if the claimant seeks
damages. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
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consistently with the congressional intent in placing an exhaustion requirement in the habeas corpus statute.88 Originally, the rule was based
on considerations of comity between federal and state judiciaries and did
not extend to challenges to state administrative action. 8 ' Exhaustion
seems to have developed to allow states a chance to determine if the
prisoner was being legally detained before the federal courts could pass
judgment.8 5 Thus, it seems to be correct to require exhaustion for
challenges to state prison administrations only when a successful challenge would xesult in release. There is a valid distinction between the
federal courts ordering relief that will release a prisoner who had
violated state laws, as opposed to relief that will only require the states to
adjust their administrative procedures. Since the prisoner violated state
laws, the state courts should have the first opportunity to determine if the
prisoner should be released. However, there is no similar policy requiring the state to have the first opportunity to consider allegedly unconstitutional prison administrative procedures. By limiting the policy expressed in Preiser,the courts have paid tribute to this distinction and
have simplified the relevant inquiry to whether the claimant is seeking
release or whether release would result from the relief requested.
A final underlying reason for the hesitancy of the federal courts to
broaden Preiseris the changing view of the status of prisoners. In Cruz
v. Beto8" the Supreme Court, rejecting the notion that the prisoner
occupies a basically rightless status, stated that the federal courts are "to
enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners. .

.

. [and that] persons in prison, like other individuals, have

the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. .... 87
This changed concept of the prisoner's status seems to have developed during the prison reform period of the past decade. During
this period the federal courts have offered prisoners the most sympathetic forum available,"' and it seems that federal judges want the federal
83. Judge Parker, the author of the habeas corpus statute, explains the purpose of
the statute. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
84. Id.
85. See S. RPp. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
86. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
87. Id. at 321.
88. Judge James Doyle of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin commented on how he thought the courts should respond to prisoners' claims:
"I believe that the courts should be no less and no more painstaking, searching, and
respectful in their response to these litigants than they are in their response to any other
constitutional litigation." Doyle based his answer on the oath administered to federal
judges: "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons...
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courts to continue to be vehicles for prison reform. By limiting the
application of Preiser,federal judges can continue to insure prisoners a
forum in which to redress their grievances.
Bradford holds a place of importance among the numerous decisions applying the Preiser test. The challenge to the parole hearing
presented the court with a situation in which it could have justified an
extension of the Preisertest and channeled the claim back into the state
courts. However, the court said in essence that simply improving the
chances of release is not sufficient to be within the "core." Bradford
interpreted Preiser to require prisoners to proceed under habeas corpus
only when the challenge is directly to the fact or duration of confinement and the relief requested is immediate release from imprisonment.
Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, section 1983 will be useful not only to
challenge poor physical conditions but also to challenge the internal
administration of many prison proceedings. Besides allowing challenges to the parole hearing, the Fourth Circuit should grant jurisdiction
of section 1983 claims that challenge the procedures used in deciding to
transfer an inmate from one prison facility to another, assuming there
was a deprivation of liberty or property, and challenges to the procedures that place an inmate in special facilities (such as special facilities
for drug offenders).89 In the above contexts, the prisoners should be
able to seek a restraint of enforcement of present procedural rules and
adoption of new ones.90 Hopefully, these claims will force lower courts
as well as the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of many
prison procedures. Favorable rulings in the federal courts will force the
prisons to adopt procedures that reflect the fact that prisoners do have
rights and will eventually lead to uniform procedures among the state
prisons. Inmates have sought a forum in which they can play an active
role in changing the penal system from one that views the prisoner as
being constitutionally naked to one that recognizes that prisoners do
have rights that must be protected.91 Bradford's extension of jurisdicdo equal right to the poor and to the rich. . . support and defend the Constitution."
Doyle, supra note 9, at 406-07.
89. Even if a transfer from one facility is considered "release" within the Preiser
rationale, the challenge to the procedures employed in deciding on the transfer should,
under Bradford, be too remote to be considered a request for "release" and thus not
within the "core."
90. Under section 1983 the prisoner can seek both declaratory and injunctive relief
which would accomplish these results.
91. Singer and Keating have pointed out that the lack of effective grievance
procedures is one of the major reasons for prison violence. Singer & Keating, supra note
4, at 367. It is difficult for the average citizen to appreciate the frustration that
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tion over prisoners' section 1983 claims demonstrates that the federal
courts will offer the prisoners this sympathetic forum and enable them to
take an active role in correcting unconstitutional conditions and procedures in the state prisons.
WILLIAM SIDNEY ALDRIDGE

Federal Jurisdiction-The Status of Public Officials as "Persons" Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the right of
a tenured public school teacher to continued employment is a protected
property interest1 that cannot be taken away without due process.2
The employee facing removal is generally entitled to a hearing on the
charges. brought against him in which he can confront and crossexamine witnesses.3 Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edge!ield County School District4 and

Thomas v. Ward greatly enhanced the opportunity for the victim of
prisoners experience within the prison grievance system and parole system. James
Hoffa, former president of the Teamsters' Union, commented on his observations of the
parole board while he was in prison: "I know of an individual who served 27 years in
prison and was allowed exactly three minutes to appear in front of the parole board and
then they said, Well, we want to study you two more years. What they found out in 29
years that they couldn't find out in 27 I'll never find out." Hoffa, Criminal Justice from
the Inside, 56 JuticATo'i 422, 425 (1973). Hopefully prisoners' section 1983 suits will
be effective in eliminating this type of process.
One lawyer seemed to sum up the situation best: "It is often difficult for attorneys,
or courts, whose entire universe revolves around rational decision-making, to fully
comprehend the total and arbitrary power which has characterized prison authorities'
control over the lives of prisoners. Administrative decisions which drastically affect the
lives and liberty of thousands of prisoners have often been made on the flimsiest of
information, without review." Brief for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency as Amicus Curiae at 3, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (dictum). In Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court expanded Roth to include not only those
teachers who were formally tenured, but also those who had an implied or "de facto"
tenure. Such tenure is to be ascertained by an examination of the historical policies
and practices of the institution. 408 U.S. at 602-03. For a similar statutory doctrine
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142 (1975) (establishing formal dismissal procedures for
teachers with more than three consecutive years of service in one school district).
2. Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Fraley, 470
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
3. McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1973).
4. 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
5. Civil No. 74-1541 (4th Cir., Nov. 24, 1975).

